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NOTE
APPLICATION OF THE GOOD-FAITH
EXCEPTION IN INSTANCES OF A
PREDICATE ILLEGAL SEARCH:
"REASONABLE" MEANS AROUND THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE?
The exclusionary rule provides that, in general, evidence ob-
tained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissable at a
criminal trial.' In United States v. Leon,2 however, the Supreme
Court carved out the "good-faith exception" to this rule,3 which ap-
plies when a police officer reasonably relies on a warrant which is
later determined to be defective due to magistrate error.4 Prior to
Leon, the possibility of adopting such an exception had been a
topic of repeated discussion by the Court.' The exception has
since been modified and expanded6 to apply to more situations
1 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961) (expanding exclusionary rule
applied by states to federal proceedings); I WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FouRTH ALENDMENT § 1.1 (2d ed. 1987) (presenting history and de-
velopment of exclusionary rule); id. § 1.2 (criticizing rule); id. § 1.6 (discussing exclu-
sionary rule's role in criminal procedure); see also Thomas F. LaMacchia, The Exclu-
sionary Rule, 81 GEO. L.J. 1013 (1993) (explaining exclusionary rule's development
and current application); Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The
Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure
Cases, 83 COLUm. L. REv. 1365 (1983) (presenting historical view of exclusionary
rule's adoption and its relationship to Constitution).
2 468 U.S. 897, 902-12 (1984).
3 See LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 1.3 (discussing good-faith exception); Note, Exclu-
sionary Rule-Good-Faith Exception, 98 HARv. L. REv. 108 (1984) (analyzing new ex-
ception); Note, The Emerging Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 57 No-
Trim DA m L. REv. 112 (1981) (detailing development of rule).
4 Leon, 468 U.S. at 913.
5 See infra note 25 (listing pre-1984 comments by Justices for establishing good-
faith exception).
6 See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (discussing post-1984 development
of exception).
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than originally contemplated.7 For example, three federal circuits
recently broadened the exception to include the circumstance in
which a warrant was issued, and subsequently enforced, on the
basis of illegally obtained evidence.8
The situations before the three circuits were similar in na-
ture. In each case, the police gathered evidence through an illegal
search or seizure and then included the material in an affidavit
supporting the request for a warrant. On the basis of the affida-
vit, a magistrate issued a warrant, which was executed by a police
officer who believed the writ to be valid.
These cases parallel Leon9 in that the executing officer relied
on a defective warrant. Unlike Leon, however, the underlying de-
fect resulted from law enforcement error, not that of the magis-
trate who issued the warrant.1 ° The issue in each case was
whether the exception applied, despite the Fourth Amendment vi-
olation, in obtaining the information upon which the warrant was
based.1
7 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 920. The Court posits that the exception is effective "when
an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge
or magistrate and acted within its scope." Id.
8 See United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1419 (8th Cir. 1989) ("E]vidence
seized pursuant to a warrant, even if in fact obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, is not subject to the exclusionary rule if an objectively reasonable officer
could have believed the seizure valid."), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990); United
States v. Carmona, 858 F.2d 66, 68 (2d Cir. 1988) (reasoning that officers conducting
search acted in good faith on validity of warrant); United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d
1359, 1369 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that magistrate determines legality of search by
issuance or denial of warrant; officer has no duty to look further), cert. denied, 106
U.S. 166 (1985); United States v. Thornton, 746 F.2d 39, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("'[Rieliable physical evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on a warrant is-
sued by a detached and neutral magistrate.., should be admissible in the prosecu-
tion's case in chief.'" (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 913)); infra notes 56-58 (detailing
cases); see also United States v. Kiser, 948 F.2d 418, 421 (8th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he exclu-
sionary rule should not apply to suppress evidence when an officer has acted with
'objective good faith' in obtaining a search warrant ultimately determined to be inva-
lid."), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1666 (1992).
9 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (discussing original good faith ex-
ception case).
10 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-08 (detailing facts where original good faith excep-
tion applied). The good-faith exception was originally intended to circumvent the ex-
clusionary rule when someone other than an officer has engaged in wrongful conduct.
Id. at 920-21. The rationale here is that the exclusionary rule's primary purpose of
deterrence is not served because there is no need to deter officer misconduct. Id.
Rather, the magistrate has erred in determining that probable cause existed, when, in
fact, it did not. Id. at 922-23.
11 See infra notes 62-98 and accompanying text (outlining cases that addressed
issue). The circumstances in Leon, see supra note 7, can be contrasted with the recent
APPLICATION OF GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION
This note discusses the evolution and expansion of the good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule and forecasts its future.
Part I traces the historical development of the good-faith excep-
tion. Part II outlines the application of the exception since Leon,
including its recent expansion. A discussion of this recent expan-
sion, and the lower courts' division on the issue, is presented in
Part III. Finally, Part IV attempts to predict the Supreme Court's
resolution of the issue and discusses whether this anticipated res-
olution will comport with prior Court rationale.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be
subject to unreasonable searches and seizures and requires that
warrants be issued only upon probable cause and with sufficient
specificity.' 2 Attempts to interpret the Framers' intent with re-
spect to this amendment have generated a controversial body of
law.13 Since the language of the Fourth Amendment does not pre-
scribe a remedy for infringement of the guarantees provided
therein,14 the courts have fashioned the "exclusionary rule."1 5
Tribunals employ this legal principle in order to suppress evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment guarantees. 16
expansion of the good faith exception in situations where an officer violated the
Fourth Amendment prior to obtaining a warrant. See supra note 8 (detailing recent
expansion cases where good-faith exception was applied).
12 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.
Id.
13 See George Anastaplo, Amendments to the Constitution of the United States: A
Commentary, 23 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 631, 697-701 (1992) (tracing historical basis of
Fourth Amendment and inherent questions of interpretation); Don Mayer, Workplace
Privacy and the Fourth Amendment: An End to Reasonable Expectations?, 29 AM.
Bus. L.J. 625, 626-29 (1992) (noting that current technology requires analysis of
Fourth Amendment beyond Framers' intent).
14 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976). The Fourth Amendment "has
never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all
proceedings or against all persons." Id.
15 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961) (adopting federal exclusionary
rule).
16 See id at 659-60.
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The exclusionary rule has suffered due to a disjointed devel-
opment and frequently inconsistent application 17 that has re-
sulted in a dispute over its primary goal and its jurisprudential
basis.18 The purposes to be served by the rule, which naturally
guide its interpretation, are also disputed.19 It is argued that the
exclusionary rule is necessary to maintain the judicial integrity of
17 See Stewart, supra note 1, at 1366.
Looking back, the exclusionary rule seems a bit jerry-built-like a roller
coaster track constructed while the roller coaster sped along. Each new
piece of track was attached hastily and imperfectly to the one before it, just
in time to prevent the roller coaster from crashing, but without the opportu-
nity to measure the curves and dips preceding it or to contemplate the twists
and turns that inevitably lay ahead. With the wisdom of hindsight, it is
certainly possible to criticize opinions dealing with the exclusionary rule for
misapplying or misconstruing prior precedents and for failing to consider
how any given decision would affect the future development of the law.
Id.
18 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914). The exclusionary rule
serves two primary goals: promoting judicial integrity, which is based on the belief
that courts would be tainted by the use of illegally obtained evidence because they
would be condoning the illegal conduct, id., and deterring police from engaging in
illegal conduct. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 ("[Tihe court itself recognized that the
purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disre-
gard it.'" (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. at 217.)). See also Stone v. Pow-
ell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976) (limiting reach of judicial integrity purpose).
There are two views on the exclusionary rule's relationship to the Fourth Amend-
ment. See J. Donald Hobart, Jr., Note, Illinois v. Krull: Extending the Fourth Amend-
ment Exclusionary Rule's Good Faith Exception to Warrantless Searches Authorized
by Statute, 66 N.C. L. REv. 781 (1988). The first is that the rule is an integral part of
the constitutional rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, and is mandated by
the Constitution to preserve judicial integrity. Id. at 788. The second view is that the
rule is one of judicial creation and should be used as a remedy when exclusion pur-
poses are fulfilled. Id. at 788-89. The Supreme Court adopted the second view in
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974). Although Justice Brennan
argued to adopt the former view, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 935 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting), no other serious advancement of this notion has been sug-
gested since Mapp, 367 U.S. at 662 (Black, J., concurring). Hobart, supra, at 789
n.63; see also supra note 8 (citing various interpretations of exclusionary rule and its
application).
19 See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 (indicating deterrence as primary purpose); see
also Stone, 428 U.S. at 485 (1976) (eliminating judicial integrity purpose). The dis-
pute is seen most clearly in Justice Brennan's dissent in Leon.
By remaining within its redoubt of empiricism and by basing the rule solely
on the deterrence rationale, the Court has robbed the rule of legitimacy....
[T]he Court should restore to its proper place the principle framed 70 years
ago in Weeks that an individual whose privacy has been invaded in violation
of the Fourth Amendment has a right grounded in that Amendment to pre-
vent the government from subsequently making use of any evidence so
obtained.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 943 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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proceedings which would be compromised by the introduction of
tainted evidence.20 The prevalent view, however, is that the ex-
clusionary rule's sole purpose is to deter police officers from acting
in violation of the Fourth Amendment;21 therefore, the rule should
be applied only when suppression is likely to result in future de-
terrence.2 2 In addition, the efficacy of this deterrent function is
measured by its institutional deterrent effect, rather than its ef-
fect on the individual officer.23
20 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 943 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is submitted that Bren-
nan's dissent made clear that the judicial integrity view should again be considered a
factor in determining whether the exclusionary rule should be applied.
21 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 955 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
If the overall educational effect of the exclusionary rule is considered,
application of the rule to even those situations in which individual police
officers have acted on the basis of a reasonable but mistaken belief that their
conduct was authorized can still be expected to have a considerable long-
term deterrent effect. If evidence is consistently excluded in these circum-
stances, police departments will surely be prompted to instruct their officers
to devote greater care and attention ....
Id.; see also United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975) (stating that courts
hope to deter future officers as well as those who committed violation); Elkins, 364
U.S. at 217 (holding that purpose of rule is to prevent, not repair, specific violation);
H.L.A. HART, PtSHMsENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 19 (1968) (refuting notion that exclu-
sionary rule should not apply when officers believed they were acting in accordance
with Fourth Amendment).
22 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-07. The Court stated: "IThe ... question.., must be
resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution's
case in chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence obtained in reliance on a
search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that ultimately is found
to be defective." Id. The Calandra Court "weigh[ed] the potential injury to the historic
role and fumctions of the grand jury against the potential benefits of the [exclusionary]
rule as applied." Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349; see also Anthony C. Amsterdam, Search,
Seizure, and § 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 389 (1964) (stating that
balancing test is used upon application of exclusionary rule).
In every litigation in which exclusion is in issue, a strong public interest
in deterring official illegality is balanced against a strong public interest in
convicting the guilty. As the exclusionary rule is applied after time, it seems
that its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of diminishing re-
turns, and beyond that point its continued application is a public nuisance.
Id.
23 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 955 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing R. VON Dun-
zNnET L., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, AND
PRACTICES §§ 8-12 (1983)); Stewart, supra note 1, at 1402 (noting importance of en-
couraging law enforcement officers to establish procedures in compliance with Fourth
Amendment law); see also Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365,
380 (1981) (noting evolution of police department standards in areas where exclusion-
ary rule adopted).
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Although discussion of an exception to the exclusionary rule
for cases in which police officers acted in good faith had begun as
early as 1974,24 the Supreme Court declined to adopt the good-
faith exception until the 1984 case of United States v. Leon.25 Af-
ter determining that the creation of such an exception did not
render the exclusionary rule ineffective,26 the Leon Court held
that evidence obtained by an officer acting pursuant to "a search
warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ulti-
mately found to be unsupported by probable cause"27 is admissible
in a criminal proceeding.28 In a dissenting opinion, however, Jus-
tice Brennan expressed concern over the exception's effect on in-
stitutional deterrence.29
24 See generally Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect
World: On Drawing 'Bright Lines' and 'Good Faith,' 43 U. Prrr. L. REv. 307 (1982)
(noting various journal articles and task force reports supporting good-faith
exception).
25 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Several justices had already displayed their eagerness to
accept the good-faith exception. Perhaps the most vocal was Justice White in his dis-
sent in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). Justice White
stated that "the rule should be substantially modified so as to prevent its application
in those many circumstances where the evidence at issue was seized by an officer
acting in the good-faith belief that his conduct comported with existing law and hav-
ing reasonable grounds for this belief." Id. at 538. Chief Justice Burger also proposed
limiting the rule "to egregious, bad-faith conduct." Id. at 501 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
In United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), Justice Rehnquist said that the
rule should only be applied when "the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may
properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 542. Finally, Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist,
stated that the exclusionary rule should not be applied unless the "underlying prem-
ise" is that "the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct
which has deprived the defendant of some right." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 612
(1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447
(1974)); see Leon, 468 U.S. at 913 n.11 (1984) (detailing Justices' different opinions);
LaFave, supra note 24, at 338-40 (commenting on different Justices' positions).
26 Leon, 468 U.S. at 905.
27 Id. at 900.
28 Id. at 922. "[Tlhe marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing
evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated
search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion . . . ." Id.
29 See id. at 957 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Moreover, the good-faith exception will encourage police to provide only the
bare minimum of information in future warrant applications. The police will
now know that if they can secure a warrant, so long as the circumstances of
its issuance are not "entirely unreasonable," all police conduct pursuant to
that warrant will be protected from further judicial review.
Id. (citations omitted).
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The original rationale for the establishment of a good-faith ex-
ception in these instances was grounded in the deterrence purpose
of the exclusionary rule.3 0 Ultimately, the exception's use was de-
termined on a case by case basis3 1 after careful consideration of
the exclusionary rule's objectives and "the constitutional princi-
ples [the rule was] designed to protect."32 The Leon Court noted
that in certain circumstances, in which an officer's reliance on the
magistrate's warrant was not objectively reasonable, the interests
ofjustice dictated that the good faith exception was inapplicable. 33
Taken as a whole, however, the Court believed that the exception
would not hinder the protection granted by the Fourth
Amendment. 4
30 See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 916-17. The Court advanced three reasons for apply-
ing a good faith exception. First, that the rule was not designed to punish officers for
the errors of judges and magistrates. Id. at 916. The Court reasoned that since "an
officer cannot [ordinarily] be expected to question the magistrate's probable-cause de-
termination or his judgement that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient,"
penalizing the police officer for the judge's mistake would not add to the deterrent
effect. Id. at 921. Second, the Court noted that judges were not inclined to disregard
Fourth Amendment protections, so that exclusion would not serve as a deterrent
when they err. Id. at 916. Finally, the Court found no proof that there would be a
significant deterrent effect on magistrates and judges even if the rule were applied in
these instances. Id. at 916-17.
31 Id. at 918.
32 See id. at 911 (noting that flagrancy of police conduct must be examined to
determine if exclusionary rule objectives are threatened).
In short, the "dissipation of the taint" concept that the Court has applied in
deciding whether exclusion is appropriate in a particular case "attempts to
mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action
become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no
longer justifies its cost."
Id. at 911 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring
in part)).
33 Id. at 922-23. The Court noted four situations in which the good-faith excep-
tion would not apply. Id. at 923. The first arises when a judge is misled by information
in the affidavit which the afflant knew to be false. Id. See Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154 (1978) (officer knowingly lied in affidavit and good-faith exception was ruled
inapplicable). The second occurs when the magistrate totally abandons his judicial
role. Leon, 463 U.S. at 923. See also Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979)
(joining police in search compromised magistrate's neutral and detached role). The
third situation arises when the warrant is so obviously lacking in probable cause that
the officer's reliance would be unreasonable. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. Finally, the Court
noted that the good-faith exception would not apply when the warrant is deficient
such that the officer could detect the defect by merely looking at it. Id.; cf United
States v. McQuagge, 787 F. Supp. 637, 651 (E.D. Tex. 1991) (summarizing where
good-faith exception has been applied).
34 Leon, 468 U.S. at 924.
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Writing for the Leon Court, Justice White recognized a long-
standing preference for search warrants, and deference to the
magistrates who issue them.3 5 He noted the remedial nature of
the exclusionary rule and the limited situations in which it should
be applied because of societal costs of lost convictions.16 In analyz-
ing the exclusionary rule's role in criminal jurisprudence, the
Court discussed previous cases in which the rule was deemed in-
appropriate. 7 Noting the primacy of the deterrence function in
applying the exclusionary rule, the Court questioned what the de-
terrent effect would be on magistrates and police officers if the evi-
dence were supressed in these cases. The Court concluded that
the deterrence of magistrates was not at issue,38 and that there
was no evidence presented that magistrates attempted to subvert
the Fourth Amendment.3 9 The Court found that there would be
no deterrent effect on police officers because the defect was due to
magistrate error in determining probable cause rather than police
illegality.40 Thus, the benefits of suppression did not outweigh the
costs, and the "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule be-
came law.4 '
In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the majority's
analysis was misplaced.4 2 He stated that the judicial branch
played an important role in preserving constitutional principles;
therefore, the Court should reject evidence gathered in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. 43 He further argued that the Court's de-
terrence analysis was unworkable, 44 and that it incorrectly ap-
plied the deterrence rationale by focusing on the deterrence of in-
dividual officers rather than the institutional preventative
effect.45 Believing that institutional deterrence would not be pro-
moted by the Leon holding, Justice Brennan stated that the ma-
35 Id. at 914.
36 Id. at 907-08.
37 Id. at 909-11.
38 Id. at 916.
39 Id. at 917.
40 Id. at 920-21.
41 Id. at 922.
42 Id. at 933-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 941 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent notes two reasons for the anal-
ysis' failure. First, it is argued, the Fourth Amendment itself, rather than the exclu-
sionary rule, imposes the costs of suppressing evidence. Id. at 941. Second, the judici-
ary is unable to effectively weigh the benefits of deterrence against its costs due to the
lack of empirical data. Id. at 942-43.
45 Id. at 952-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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jority's decision would promote police ignorance of the Fourth
Amendment instead of education.46 Ultimately, Justice Brennan
warned of "a host of grave consequences"4 7 which would result
from the majority's decision to create a good faith exception when
an officer reasonably relied on a magistrate's mistaken determina-
tion of probable cause.48
II. THE ExPANsION OF THE GOOD-FAITH
ExcEPTioN's APPLICATION
Courts have expanded the good faith exception to govern situ-
ations beyond the immediate facts of its genesis in Leon.49 In Illi-
nois v. Krull,50 for example, the Supreme Court held that the
good-faith exception applied to an officer's reasonable reliance on
a statute that was later determined to be unconstitutional. 5' In
addition, in determining that an officer's behavior was constitu-
tional, the Fifth Circuit has held that the exception extended to
her reliance on a subsequently overturned court decision.-2 Fi-
46 Id. at 955 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Armed with the assurance provided by today's decisions that evidence will
always be admissible whenever an officer has "reasonably" relied upon a
warrant, police departments will be encouraged to train officers that if a
warrant has simply been signed, it is reasonable, without more, to rely on it.
Id. Rather, Justice Brennan felt that it was reasonable to expect the officer to corrob-
orate warrants issued to them, in order to ascertain whether they were in fact behav-
ing reasonably in relying on the magistrate's probable cause determination. Id. at
948.
47 Id. at 956 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan warned of three consequences.
First, the message sent to magistrates would be that their probable cause determina-
tions in the issuance of warrants would not be subject to further judicial review. Id. at
956. Second, the majority's decision effectively encouraged police to give minimal in-
formation in their warrant applications. Id. at 957. Finally, he argued, the ruling
hampered the Court's goal of establishing greater flexibility for police in obtaining
warrants. Id. at 958; see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (discussing flexibil-
ity goal).
49 See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (officer's reasonable reliance on uncon-
stitutional statute justifies use of good-faith exception); United States v. Jackson, 825
F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1987) (good-faith exception applied when officer's reliance on court
decision later determined to be unconstitutional was reasonable), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 711 (1988); United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1987) (reasonable-
ness of federal officer's reliance on foreign law officer's assurance that search was
valid).
50 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
51 See Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50 (admitting evidence against defendant even
though statute relied upon was judicially invalidated after search and seizure).
52 See Jackson, 825 F.2d at 865-66 (recognizing good-faith exception where there
was reasonable reliance on court precedent validating warrantless searches).
1994]
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nally, the Ninth Circuit determined that the good-faith exception
applied when federal investigators relied on a foreign law enforce-
ment officer's actions that were later determined to be violative of
the foreign law.53
In each instance, the courts decided to apply the good-faith
exception after balancing the goal of deterrence against the cost of
suppressing of the evidence.54 In each case, the courts applied the
good faith exception because the deterrence purpose would not be
served. 5 Notably, the constitutional violation was invariably
made by someone other than the police.
This recent expansion of the good-faith exception suggests
that it should apply when officers objectively relied on a warrant
issued on the basis of an illegal predicate search. In these in-
stances, the initial acts of the officers constituted a constitutional
violation, but a warrant was subsequently issued, and a further
search ensued. Ultimately, as in court decisions expanding the
good-faith exception, a determination of whether the good-faith
exception should be extended must turn on the balancing of the
exclusionary rule's deterrent effect against the societal costs of
suppression.
53 See Peterson, 812 F.2d 492 (holding that exception triggered when officers rea-
sonably relied on foreign law enforcement officer's representations regarding compli-
ance with foreign law).
54 See Krull, 480 U.S. at 352 ("There is nothing to indicate that applying the ex-
clusionary rule to evidence seized pursuant to the statute prior to the declaration of
its invalidity will act as a significant, additional deterrent."); Jackson, 825 F.2d at 866
("Excluding the evidence can in no way affect [the officer's] future conduct unless it is
to make him less willing to do his duty." (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
920 (1984))); Peterson, 812 F.2d at 491 ("[Olur inquiry is whether exclusion serves the
rationale of deterring federal officers from unlawful conduct.").
55 For instances where courts have declined to broaden the exception's scope, see
United States v. Whaley, 781 F.2d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[T]o extend the exception
so far as to allow evidence of a clearly unlawful warrantless search of residential
property would put too great a premium on ignorance of the law and would virtually
terminate the exclusionary rule."); United States v. Curzi, 867 F.2d 36, 44 (1st Cir.
1989) (good-faith exception does not apply to warrantless search of home where error
is attributable solely to agents); United States v. Winsor, 846 F.2d 1569, 1579 (9th
Cir. 1988) (good-faith exception only applies to searches conducted in reliance on war-
rant or statute); United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1165 (6th Cir. 1984) (good-
faith exception does not apply to warrantless entry into defendant's home resulting in
arrest and seizure of gun), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1061 (1985).
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III. THE NEw APPLICATION AND EXTENSION OF THE
GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION
Courts that have considered the extension of the exception to
cover illegal predicate searches are divided. The good-faith excep-
tion in this area has been applied by the Second,56 Eighth, and
District of Columbia58 Circuits. Conversely, the extension of the
rule was held not to apply in the Ninth Circuit,59 as well as in
certain federal district 60 and state61 courts.
A. Courts Extending the Application of the Exception
It is submitted that courts which have extended the good faith
exception have done so without sufficient rationale for their deci-
sions.62 The Eighth Circuit cases analyzed airport searches con-
ducted by Drug Enforcement Agency agents. 3 In United States v.
56 See United States v. Carmona, 858 F.2d 66, 68 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying good
faith exception to search warrant that resulted from illegal sweep of home); United
States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1368 (2d Cir.) (upholding admission of evidence
when canine sniff used to obtain warrant constituted illegal search), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 66 (1985).
57 See United States v. Kiser, 948 F.2d 418, 422 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying good
faith exception to warrant based on information obtained in illegal detention and
seizure), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1666 (1992); United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413,
1419 (8th Cir. 1989) (declining to suppress evidence because of good faith of officers
although warrant was obtained as result of DEA agents' illegal search and seizure),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990).
58 See United States v. Thornton, 746 F.2d 39, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (declining to
determine whether there was predicate illegal search and applying good faith excep-
tion to admit evidence).
59 See United States v. Wanless, 882 F.2d 1459, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding
that evidence obtained in illegal inventory and resulting illegal investigatory search
may not be used to establish probable cause); United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782,
789-90 (9th Cir. 1987) (suppressing evidence obtained through warrant based on ille-
gal inventory search).
60 See United States v. Solomon, 728 F. Supp. 1544, 1549-50 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (re-
fusing to apply good faith exception when warrant was based on illegal arrest and
search); United States v. Villard, 678 F. Supp. 483, 490-93 (D.N.J. 1988) (suppressing
evidence when unjustified search pursuant to arrest provided improper basis for
warrant).
61 See Arizona v. Hicks, 707 P.2d 331, 333 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (declining to ap-
ply good faith exception when warrant was based on unconstitutional search follow-
ing justified warrantless entry).
62 See supra note 49 (citing cases which have extended good faith exception); see
also infra notes 99-118 (analyzing case rationales and comparing them among differ-
ing courts).
63 See supra note 57 (citing two Eighth Circuit cases extending good faith excep-
tion to predicate illegal searches).
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White,64 for example, the court recognized that the illegal seizure
and detention violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights.65 The information obtained during the course of this de-
tention was used, however, to apply for a warrant,66 which re-
sulted in a further search and discovery of incriminating evi-
dence.67 The majority denied the defendant's motion to have the
evidence suppressed, citing Leon as the applicable law.68 The
court continued, "[w]e believe the Fourth Amendment was vio-
lated, but we also believe the facts of this case are close enough to
the line of validity to make the officers' belief in validity of the
warrant objectively reasonable."69
The facts of United States v. Kiser70 are almost identical to
those in White.71 In Kiser, the court failed to advance additional
reasons for applying the good-faith exception and simply cited
White.72 The defendant in Kiser argued that White should be over-
ruled73 because Leon "cannot be applied to a situation where an
unconstitutional detention and seizure occurred before officers ob-
tained their search warrant."7 4 The court responded that even if
it had the power to overrule White,75 it would not do so because
they found that court's reasoning persuasive.76
In United States v. Thornton,77 the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit declined to examine whether any prior illegality existed 78 and
applied the good-faith exception. 79 The court stated that suppres-
sion was unnecessary so long as the magistrate did not abandon
"his detached and neutral role."8 ° The court applied the objective
reasonableness standard established in Leon8 1 to determine
64 890 F.2d 1413 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990).
65 Id. at 1414.
66 Id. at 1415.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1414.
69 Id. at 1419.
70 948 F.2d 418 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1666 (1992).
71 Id. at 421-22.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 422.
74 Id.
75 Id. "This panel is without authority to overrule the earlier panel's decision in
White. Only the court sitting en banc has such authority." Id.
76 Id.
77 746 F.2d 39 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
78 Id. at 49.
79 Id.
80 Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984)).
81 Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.
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whether the officer's act prior to obtaining the warrant could sup-
port the writ,"2 rather than to determine the objective reasonable-
ness of the officer executing the warrant."'
B. Courts Not Extending the Exception
The basic theory upon which these cases operated is most suc-
cinctly set forth in United States v. Vasey,8 4 in which the Ninth
Circuit stated that "the magistrate's consideration of the evidence
does not sanitize the taint of the illegal warrantless search."8 5 In
Vasey, a judge issued a warrant on the basis of evidence found
during a warrantless search of the defendant's car.8 6 The court
declined to apply the good-faith exception, 7 finding that the ex-
clusionary rule's deterrence purpose applied, 8 and that the mag-
istrate who issued the writ was not in a position to evaluate the
validity of the search. 9
The United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey arrived at the same result in United States v. Villard.9 ° In
Villard, the officer legally entered the premises pursuant to an
arrest warrant, but later conducted an illegal search.91 The infor-
mation found during the unlawful probe was then used in an affi-
davit accompanying a search warrant.9 2 The court held that it
82 See Thornton, 746 F.2d at 49. "[Ilt was not unreasonable for the police to be-
lieve that there was probable cause that money and records were being kept at 1270
Simms Place." Id. It is submitted that this implies that the officer's seizure and
search of garbage from this location, later determined to be a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, was justified and reasonable, and therefore worthy of the protection of
the good faith exception.
83 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.
84 834 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1987).
85 Id. at 789.
86 Id. at 784.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 789. The court determined that the officer's warrantless search, later
included in the affidavit requesting a search warrant, was "activity that the exclusion-
ary rule was meant to deter." Id.
89 Id.
A magistrate's role when presented with evidence to support a search war-
rant is to weigh the evidence to determine whether it gives rise to probable
cause. A magistrate evaluating a warrant application based in part on evi-
dence seized in a warrantless search is simply not in a position to evaluate
the legality of that search.
Id.
90 678 F. Supp. 483, 490-93 (D.N.J. 1988).
91 Id. at 485.
92 Id. at 486.
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would be inconsistent with Leon to apply the good-faith exception
to the evidence seized in the execution of the warrant.9 3
The courts deciding United States v. Wanless94 and United
States v. Solomon 95 reached the same conclusion after close analy-
ses of the purposes of the exception according to Leon.96 In Solo-
mon, the magistrate granted a search warrant on the basis of
statements illegally obtained from the defendant and evidence
seized during a car search in violation of the accused's Fourth
Amendment rights.9 v In Wanless, the foundation for the warrant
was illegally obtained evidence gathered during a warrantless in-
vestigatory search of the defendant's car.98
C. Analysis of Courts Considering Extension
In comparing the divergent rationales of courts considering
extension of the good-faith exception, it appears that those courts
refusing to expand the exception present reasoning more firmly
grounded in the principles advanced in Leon than that of courts
favoring extension. Balancing the preventive purpose against the
cost of suppression is present in each of the opinions that declined
to apply the exception to instances in which a predicate illegal
search existed. 99 This is evidenced in Vasey, in which an analysis
of the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule and its role in
93 Id. at 490. "Leon did not address the situation presented here, where the infor-
mation upon which the search warrant was based was itself the product of an illegal,
warrantless search by a police officer." Id. at 491. The court declined to apply the
good faith exception, recognizing that the exclusionary rule was meant to deter future
police misconduct. Id.
94 882 F.2d 1459, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1989).
95 728 F. Supp. 1544, 1549-50 (S.D. Fla 1990).
96 In Wanless, the court held that the officer-affiant's truthfulness in applying for
a warrant was insufficient to invoke the good faith exception. Wanless, 882 F.2d at
1466. Instead, the rule was as set forth in Vasey: "the search pursuant to the warrant
would be valid only if the legally obtained evidence, standing alone, was sufficient to
establish probable cause." Id. at 1467.
In Solomon, the court held that the good faith exception would not apply when an
illegal arrest and subsequent illegal search formed the basis for the warrant applica-
tion. Solomon, 728 F. Supp. at 1549. The warrant was invalid because the officer
omitted how he obtained the evidence set forth in the affidavit. Id. at 1549-50. The
court noted that "to excuse the officer's material omissions ... would encourage the
police to be less than candid in applying for warrants." Id. at 1550.
97 Id. at 1549.
98 882 F.2d at 1461.
99 See supra notes 59-61 (cases where good faith exception was not applied where
predicate violation of Fourth Amendment existed).
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determining whether the good-faith exception should apply was
central to the court's holding.'0
Inherent in the decisions that did not extend the exception
was the application of the objective reasonableness test to an of-
ficer's actions after the warrant had been issued rather than
before. 10 ' Understanding that the good-faith exception should be
considered only after determining that the deterrent function
would not be served,10 these courts noted that the necessity of
discouraging the initial illegal search or seizure precluded the use
of the exception.' 0 3 Courts that overlook this essential element of
the Leon rationale may inexcusably violate an individual's Fourth
100 834 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 1987).
The search warrant was issued, at least in part, on the basis of this tainted
evidence. The constitutional error was made by the officer in this case, not
by the magistrate as in Leon. The Leon Court made it very clear that the
exclusionary rule should apply (i.e. the good faith exception should not ap-
ply) if the exclusion of evidence would alter the behavior of individual law
enforcement officers or the policies of their department. Leon, 468 at 918.
Officer Jensen's conducting an illegal, warrantless search and including evi-
dence found in this search in an affidavit in support of a warrant is an activ-
ity that the exclusionary rule was meant to deter.
Id. (citations omitted).
101 See supra note 82 (describing misapplication of objective reasonableness
standard).
102 See supra notes 22 and 32 (setting forth balancing test to determine if good-
faith exception should preclude application of exclusionary rule); see also Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (focusing on deterrence rationale in application of exclu-
sionary rule).
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the
police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which
has deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence
gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particu-
lar investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of
care towards the rights of the accused. Where the official action was pur-
sued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of
its force.
Id. at 447.
103 See Solomon, 728 F. Supp. at 1549-50 (stating that good faith exception did
not apply since no reasonable officer could rely on illegally obtained evidence to be-
lieve warrant was based on probable cause); Wanless, 882 F.2d at 1466-67 ("because
the search warrant was issued in part on the basis of evidence obtained from an ille-
gal search of the vehicles, the 'good faith exception' does not apply"); Villard, 678 F.
Supp. at 492 ("The cavalier behavior.., must be deterred. A court should not en-
courage such 'carelessness' by permitting the introduction of the resulting evidence");
Vasey, 834 F.2d at 789-90 ("we therefore conclude that a magistrate's consideration
does not protect from exclusion evidence seized during a search under a warrant if
that warrant was based on evidence seized in an unconstitutional search").
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Amendment rights.104 Actually, the Leon Court seemed to warn
against this result.0 5
Contrast these cases with the rationale of the courts that ex-
tended the good-faith exception to situations involving predicate
illegal searches. 1 6 The court in United States v. Thornton,10 7 for
example, applied the objective reasonableness analysis to the
prior illegality rather than the subsequent reliance on the war-
rant. 08 This approach, apparent in other decisions,' 0 9 is mark-
edly different from Leon. In Leon, the Court applied the objective
reasonableness test to judge the officer's behavior after the magis-
trate had erred. 10 The good-faith exception has previously been
104 See Craig M. Bradley, The Good Faith Exception Cases: Reasonable Exercise
in Futility, 60 IND. L.J. 287, 302 (1985). "Despite the police's good faith belief in its
validity, the warrant is simply the fruit of a (warrantless) poisonous tree and the
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule would be advanced by excluding [the evi-
dence]." Id.
105 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). "Nothing in our opinion sug-
gests, for example, that an officer could obtain a warrant on the basis of a 'bare bones'
affidavit and then rely on colleagues who are ignorant of the circumstances under
which the warrant was obtained to conduct the search." Id. at n.24 (citation omitted).
It is suggested, therefore, that the good-faith exception should not apply if the circum-
stances under which the warrant was obtained were suspicious or illegal.
106 See supra notes 56-58 (citing cases).
107 746 F.2d 39, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see supra note 82 (setting forth Thornton
test).
108 746 F.2d at 49.
109 See United States v. Carmona, 858 F.2d 66, 68 (2d Cir. 1988) (original search
was not justified under Fourth Amendment). The discovery of money in the Carmona
search was used obtain a warrant to search the premises. Id. The Carmona court,
affirming the lower court's decision, determined that "the officers conducting the
search acted in good faith reliance on the validity of the warrant," and, therefore, the
fruits of the search were admissible under Leon. Id. The court expressly approved the
lower court's reasoning. Id. (citing United States v. Londono, 659 F. Supp. 758
(E.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Carmona, 858 F.2d 66 (2d Cir.
1988)). The district court determined that there was "no evidence that the officers
knowingly or recklessly included anything false or omitted anything material in the
affidavit, or that they believed any of the submitted material to have been obtained
illegally." Id. at 764. It appears, therefore that the objective reasonableness was de-
termined on the basis of the police officer's beliefs regarding the original illegal
search, conducted prior to obtaining the warrant.
In United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 819 (1985), a canine sniff of an apartment from the outside hallway was deter-
mined to be an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment. Id. The court held that
"[t]here is nothing more the officer could have or should have done under these cir-
cumstances to be sure his search would be legal." Id. at 1368. The court determined
that the exclusionary rule "'should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law
enforcement activity.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984))
Leon, however, did not involve a warrantless search. Leon, 468 U.S. at 920.
110 Leon, 468 U.S. at 902-04.
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applied in cases in which the Fourth Amendment violation was
committed by someone other than the officer.111 Despite reliance
on a warrant granted after review by a magistrate, it is submitted
that Leon is not otherwise applicable to the cases in issue because
of factual distinctions. Nor is the rationale established in Leon to
determine when the good-faith exception should apply-by bal-
ancing the deterrent effect against the cost of suppressionI,2_
used by any of these courts.' 13
The deterrent effect should be balanced against the cost of
suppressing the evidence, 1 4 and the good-faith exception should
apply only when there would be no dissuasive effect on the officer's
behavior."15 In addition, the application of the exclusionary rule
in these cases must be analyzed with respect to its potential for
causing widespread institutional deterrence." 6 Not only would
the individual officer who conducted the predicate illegal search be
deterred, but the exclusion of the evidence would also enhance po-
lice departments' knowledge and training regarding what consti-
tutes a Fourth Amendment violation. As a result, other officers
would be deterred.
Another significant consideration is the need to ensure that
the illegal activity is not ratified or excused because a warrant is
eventually obtained.1 17 In none of the above cases was the magis-
trate aware of how the evidence was obtained. An evaluation of
this prior activity should be included in considering whether to
apply the good-faith exception." 8
11 See Krull, 480 U.S. at 345-46 (noting that search was conducted under stat-
ute, later found unconstitutional, authorizing warrantless searches); Jackson, 825
F.2d at 854 (allowing searches based on officer's good-faith reliance on caselaw that
was later overruled); United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d at 486, 492 (9th Cir. 1987)
(allowing good-faith exception although authorities conducted illegal wiretap because
officers relied on earlier cases which found legality of wiretaps objectively reasonable).
112 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (Leon rationale).
113 See supra notes 106-11; infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text (analyzing
decisions in which good faith exception extended to predicate illegal search).
114 Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-13.
115 "'[If... the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then
clearly, its use in the instant situation is unwarranted.'" Id. at 909 (quoting United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)).
116 See supra note 23 (setting forth focus of institutional deterrence).
117 See LAFAvE, supra note 1, § 1.3(f), at 65-66 (commenting that Leon should not
shield prior unlawful activity from full scrutiny at suppression hearing).
118 See Bradley, supra note 104, at 302. "The good faith exception should not pre-
clude consideration of the pre-warrant evidence-gathering techniques of the police
.... As Leon makes clear, the function of the magistrate is to determine 'whether a
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IV. How THE SUPREME COURT MIGHT ADDRESS THE EXTENSION
OF THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION
In State v. Hicks,"'9 the Arizona Court of Appeals opined that
"Leon does not hold that a subsequent warrant validates an ear-
lier illegal search. Police officers cannot launder their prior un-
constitutional behavior by presenting the fruits of it to a magis-
trate."120 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court declined
to address this question because the appellant had not properly
objected and taken exception.' 2 ' The High Court, therefore, has
yet to directly address this issue. One may surmise, nevertheless,
from previous Court decisions and statements by the Justices,
that the current Court would probably extend the good-faith ex-
ception in the factual circumstances presented.
The Supreme Court has not ruled on these aspects of the
good-faith exception since 1987.122 However, by examining a re-
cent Court opinion dealing with the exclusionary rule, it is reason-
able to assume that certain Justices would endorse the application
of the exception if a predicate illegal search had arisen.' 23 In Illi-
nois v. Rodriguez,124 the Court proffered additional means to avoid
using the exclusionary rule.125  Writing for the Court, Justice
Scalia proposed the use of an objective reasonableness test in as-
sessing an officer's behavior with respect to an individual's au-
thority to consent to a search.126 Justice Kennedy joined in this
extension of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.' 27
particular affidavit establishes probable cause,' not whether the methods used to ob-
tain the information in that affidavit were legal." Id.
119 707 P.2d 331 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985), cert. granted sub nom., Arizona v. Hicks,
475 U.S. 1107 (1986), aff'd, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
120 Id. at 333.
121 See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 329.
122 See supra notes 49-50 for detailed discussion of the 1987 cases.
123 See Wayne R. LaFave, A Fourth Amendment Fantasy: The Last (Heretofore
Unpublished) Search and Seizure Decision of the Burger Court, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV.
669 (1986) (predicting all Supreme Court Justices' individual opinions in hypothetical
involving predicate illegal search).
124 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (6-3 decision).
125 Id. at 183, 184.
126 Id. at 188. As with other factual determinations bearing upon search and
seizure, ascertaining consent to enter must "'be judged against an objective standard:
would the facts available to the officer at the moment ... warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief' that the consenting party had authority over the premises." Id.
at 188 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).
127 Id. at 177.
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The Rodriguez position appears analogous to expanding the
good-faith exception by applying an objective reasonableness test
to an officer's behavior when there has been a predicate illegal
search. 128 What is apparent in Rodriguez is the Court's increas-
ing focus on the reasonableness aspect of the Fourth Amendment
in ascertaining whether a violation has occurred. 129 Therefore, in
determining whether an officer has violated the Fourth Amend-
ment during her search or seizure, the focus is on whether the
probe was reasonable, not whether the officer correctly assessed
the situation. 13
0
Justice White's position was easiest to assess, apart from the
opinions in Rodriguez, since he had been the strongest advocate
for the good-faith exception. 13  Even before writing the Leon opin-
ion, Justice White expressed a willingness to further extend the
exception. 132 Considering Justice White's recent retirement, how-
ever,133 these decisions are only an insight into the Court's overall
development of the doctrine. More relevant to the stance of to-
128 See Thomas F. Martello, Jr., Comment, Alternative Means of Protection for
Fourth Amendment Rights: A Proposal for Ohio, 20 CAP. U.L. REv. 943, 953 (1991).
"M[The reasonableness of the officers' reliance... rendered the entire search reason-
able...."Id. "This... depicts the Court's desire to find new ways around the exclu-
sionary rule, as it results in the odd conclusion that an illegal search may nonetheless
be constitutional, provided that it is reasonable." Id.
129 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 183-84.
130 Id.; see also Frank C. Capozza, Whither the Fourth Amendment: An Analysis
of Illinois v. Rodriguez, 25 IND. L. REv. 515, 517 (1991) (commenting on Court's over-
simplification of Fourth Amendment).
131 See supra note 25 (citing Justice White's desire to create a good faith excep-
tion prior to Leon); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (White, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 947 (1977), habeas corpus denied, 923 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1991).
When law enforcement personnel have acted mistakenly, but in good
faith and on reasonable grounds, and yet the evidence they have seized is
later excluded, the exclusion can have no deterrent effect. The officers, if
they do their duty, will act in similar fashion in similar circumstances in the
future; and the only consequence of the rule as presently administered is
that unimpeachable and probative evidence is kept from the trier of fact and
the truth-finding function of proceedings is substantially impaired or a trial
totally aborted.
Id.
132 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983) (White, J., concurring) (assert-
ing that good-faith exception should apply where officials act under reasonable belief
that search and seizure is consistent with Fourth Amendment); Stone, 428 U.S. at
537-39 (White, J., dissenting) (suggesting good-faith modification of exclusionary
rule).
133 See USA: A New Justice - Ruth Bader Ginsburg, EcoNoIsT, June 19, 1993
(reporting Justice White's retirement, and President Clinton's nomination of Ruth
Bader Ginsburg to vacancy on Supreme Court).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:217
day's Court is Chief Justice Rehnquist, who expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the exclusionary rule,13 4 yet recognized its deterrent
value.' 35 The Chief Justice might extend the good faith exception
if the predicate illegal act was objectively reasonable, but merely
happened to violate the Fourth Amendment. 136 Finally, Justice
O'Connor has also expressed discontent with a strict application of
the exclusionary rule,137 and may see fit to extend the good faith
exception if convinced that the cost of the lost convictions would be
too great.13 8
Retiring Justice Blackmun's hesitancy in Leon indicated that
he would be unlikely to accept a broad application of the good faith
exception.' 3 9 Indeed, he originally recognized the exception as
134 See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 437 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),
overruled by United States v. Ross, 465 U.S. 798 (1982).
I have previously stated why I believe the so-called "exclusionary rule" cre-
ated by this Court imposes a burden out of all proportion to the Fourth
Amendment values which it seeks to advance by seriously impeding the ef-
forts of the national, state, and local governments to apprehend and convict
those who have violated their laws.
Id. (citing California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916 (1979)).
135 See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 612 (Rehnquist, J., joining Powell, J., con-
curring in part) "The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes
that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which
has deprived the defendant of some right." Id. (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433, 447 (1974)) When "this underlying premise is lacking" the exclusionary rule
should not be applied. Id.
136 See supra note 8 (discussing court of appeals decisions).
137 See Linda Greenhouse, Judge O'Connor Wins Praise at Hearing, N.Y. TIMEs,
Sept. 11, 1981, at B12. At her confirmation hearings, Justice O'Connor stated that
her experience as a trial judge "had led her to conclude that the exclusionary rule
sometimes interfered with the administration of justice by requiring the exclusion of
evidence obtained through a technical error." Id.; see also LAFAvE, supra note 24, at
340 (commenting on O'Connor's position).
138 See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032,
1041-42 (1984). Here, Justice O'Connor, relying on United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433 (1976), provided a framework for determining when the exclusionary rule should
be used, viz., when benefits, with deterrent as one factor, outweigh costs. Id.
139 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 927 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
I write separately, however, to underscore what I regard as the unavoidably
provisional nature of today's decisions .... Like all courts, we face institu-
tional limitations on our ability to gather information about "legislative
facts," and the exclusionary rule itself has exacerbated the shortage of hard
data concerning the behavior of police officers in the absence of such a rule.
Nonetheless, we cannot escape the responsibility to decide the question
before us, however imperfect our information may be, and I am prepared to
join the Court on the information now at hand.
Id. (citations omitted).
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only a "provisional" change subject to further review. 140 Most ob-
vious among the Justices to disapprove the extension is Justice
Stevens. His dissent in Leon sets forth a guarded view of the
good-faith exception's usefulness in Fourth Amendment cases. 14 '
Justice Stevens also joined Justice Marshall's dissent in Illinois v.
Rodriguez, 42 implying that the increasing focus on the reasona-
bleness aspect of the Fourth Amendment is misplaced..
4 3
Among these Justices, therefore, one could reasonably project
that Justices Scalia and Kennedy would be in favor of extending
the exception's application to cases in which a predicate illegal
search provided the information for the basis of a warrant. The
likelihood of gaining the additional votes in support of their deci-
sion is not inconceivable.
It is difficult to predict how the newest Justices would react to
a modification of the good-faith exception. In his confirmation
hearing, Justice Souter defended Leon, stating that it was com-
pletely consistent with the court's analysis in Mapp.'4 Con-
versely, Justice Thomas has defended the exclusionary rule as a
very pragmatic step toward the protection of constitutional
rights. 145 During his own confirmation hearing, Justice Breyer,
the newest Justice, was directly asked his opinion of the exclu-
sionary rule. He expressed uncertainty as to the proper policy,
noting that the rule has been "fairly widely accepted."' 4 6 Justice
Ginsburg apparently has not voiced an opinion on this issue. It
might be concluded, therefore, that Justice Souter, following the
court's analysis in Leon, would endorse such a modification, while
140 Id. at 928. See also LAFAvE, supra note 123, at 683 (predicting Blackmun's
reluctance to apply good faith exception where there is predicate illegal search).
141 Leon, 468 U.S. at 960 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "In my opinion, an official
search and seizure cannot be both 'unreasonable' and 'reasonable' at the same time."
Id.
142 497 U.S. 177, 189 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 190-91. The hesitancy to expand exceptions to the Fourth Amendment
law on reasonableness grounds is evident in Marshall's statement that "a departure
from the warrant requirement is not justified simply because an officer reasonably
believes a third party has consented to a search ...." Id. at 190.
144 Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee: Confirmation of Judge David
Souter to the Supreme Court, Federal News Service, Sept. 14, 1990, available in
LEXIS, News library.
145 Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee: Clarence Thomas Supreme Court
Nomination, Federal News Service, Sept. 12, 1991, available in LEXIS, News library.
146 Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee: Supreme Court Confirmation
Hearing for Judge Stephen G. Breyer, Federal News Service, July 1, 1994, available
in, LEXIS, News library.
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Justice Thomas, adhering to his view that constitutional rights
need protection, would reject the modification. It is very difficult
to express an opinion about the views of Justice Breyer and Jus-
tice Ginsburg on this issue.
If the Supreme Court were to endorse the exception's expan-
sion, however, it would seem to be in stark contradiction of its rea-
son for creating the exception. 147 Yet, in the case of a predicate
illegal search, there is by definition conduct to deter and pre-
vent.148 Ultimately, the issue is an individual's Fourth Amend-
ment rights. The costs and benefits of an illegal predicate search
must be balanced to determine if an invasion of this nature justi-
fies the admission of the evidence, or if the deterrent effect of ex-
clusion outweighs admission.149 Invoking the good-faith exception
in such cases would appear to make more remote the hope ex-
pressed by Justice Brennan: "[I]n time this or some later Court
will restore these precious freedoms to their rightful place as a
primary protection for our citizens against overreaching
officialdom."1 50
CONCLUSION
The development of the good-faith exception was carefully
structured to ensure that the underlying purposes of the exclu-
sionary rule were not eroded. Application of the exception has
been narrow, consistently referring to the cost/benefit balancing
approach established in Leon. The focus of a court in determining
if it should extend the good-faith exception should be whether
there is a deterrent effect on police conduct which outweighs the
cost of suppressing the evidence. The circuits that have dealt with
the issue of whether the good-faith exception applies when there
has been an illegal predicate search are split in their conclusions.
It is this author's opinion that those courts which have extended
the rule have done so without reference to the balancing test set
147 The Court fashioned the exception to recognize the governmental interest in
using such evidence, but only when it outweighs the deterrent effect of the exclusion-
ary rule. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 (referring to imposition placed on criminal justice
system's truth finding function by "unbending application of exclusionary rule"); see
also id. at 907 n.6 (setting forth studies on cost of exclusionary rule).
148 See infra notes 62-83 and accompanying text (detailing violation of Fourth
Amendment by officer prior to seeking warrant).
149 Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-07 (stating cost/benefit balancing test); see also supra
note 22 and accompanying text (illustrating application of test).
150 Leon, 468 U.S. at 960 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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forth by the Supreme Court. Interestingly enough, if this issue
were to appear before the Court, it is highly possible that it would
extend the good-faith exception as well.
Gretchan R. Diffendal

